【作者】李云雁；

【Author】 Li Yunyan

【机构】浙江财经学院政府管制研究院；

【摘要】财政分权是影响中国经济社会发展的重要制度改革,环境管制是推动企业污染治理的关键因素。在财政分权体制下,对于经济增长和环境质量的权衡取舍,中央政府和地方政府的利益诉求各有不同。地方政府作为环境管制的具体执行者,在政府间以经济激励为核心的竞争机制下,具有与企业"合谋"牺牲环境质量换取经济利益的动机。为激励地方政府更好地履行环境监管职责,约束政企合谋,中央政府可以通过向企业和地方政府支付信息租金和征收罚金,建立环境管制的激励约束机制。中国环境管制的实践具有加强中央集权模式的发展趋势,环境管制分权化的程度主要受企业减排成本差异、地区间发展水平和环境监测技术三方面因素的影响。现阶段,中国应转变以国内生产总值为核心的政府绩效考核评价体系,强化经济激励手段,提高政府补贴,积极开发环境在线监测技术,加大对环境违规的惩处力度,科学审核环境成本,增强公众的环境教育,以改善财政分权的合理性,提高财政分权体制下环境管制的效率。 更多还原

【Abstract】Fiscal decentralization is the important institution impacting economic and social development in China,environmental regulation is the key factor promoting enterprise pollution control.In the financial decentralization system,the central government and the local government interests vary between the economic growth and environmental quality trade-offs.As environmental regulation implementation,local governments have motivation of sacrificing the quality of the environment to economic profit in economic incentives among governments.To encourage local governments to make better the implementation of environmental regulation,and prevent collusion between government and enterprises,the central government should establish the incentive and constraint mechanism of environmental regulation through paying the information rent and imposing fines on local government and enterprises.